I defend here the view that (full) second order logic, if considered as a foundation of mathematics, is best understood as a fragment of set theory
I defend here the view that (full) second order logic, if considered as a foundation of mathematics, is best understood as a fragment of set theory 1 . This view is very common among set theorists, and therefore would perhaps not require defending. However, there are many non-set theorists who hold quite a different view, namely that (full) second order logic is a better foundation for mathematics because it is capable to characterise-unlike the first order logic underlying set theory-important mathematical structures up to isomorphism.
Let us first discuss what do I mean when I say that I consider second order logic as a foundation of mathematics. I have in mind the following: Whatever mathematical structures mathematicians have need of can be characterised in second order logic. Then truths about these structures can be identified with logical consequences of those characterisations. If a mathematician doubts the truth of a statement, he or she needs only to figure out what is the structure that the claim is concerned with and then check whether the characterisation of the structure logically implies the claim 2 . There are several points in this scenario which need clarification. First of all, in mathematical practice one sometimes needs to appeal to third order logic, that is, second order is not enough; but I consider this an irrelevant point 3 . Secondly, is it really true that whatever mathematical structures mathematicians have need of can indeed be characterised in second order logic up to isomorphism? After all, there are only countably many possible sentences in second order logic to use for such characterisations. However, it is almost impossible to pinpoint a mathematical structure that is (provably in ZFC) not second order characterisable, without resorting to cardinality-type arguments 4 . Finally there is the question what logical consequence means in second order logic. A priori φ is a ("weak") logical consequence of ψ if every model of ψ is a model of φ. It has turned out that this relation is highly complex, 5 which raises the question, is it actually possible to verify logical consequence in this way. There is a clear alternative: φ is a ("strong") logical consequence of ψ if every Henkin model 6 of ψ is a Henkin model of φ, or equivalently, if there is a finite proof from the Comprehension Axioms 7 . Strong logical consequence is, of course, much stronger than weak logical consequence. A famous example is the Continuum Hypothesis CH. If θ R is a second order characterisation of the continuum 8 , then either CH or ¬CH is a weak logical consequence 9 of θ R , but neither is a strong logical consequence 10 . The good news is that the CH is really exceptional 11 and virtually any logical consequence appearing in mathematics (outside set theory) turns out to be a strong one. Thus the appeal to strong logical consequence, even when weak logical consequence may seem more appealing, solves the otherwise serious complexity problem.
Next I should explain what I mean when I say that I consider set theory as a foundation of mathematics. This is easier because nowadays set theory is a much more popular foundation than second order logic. The scenario is as follows: mathematical objects are thought of as sets, whether they look like sets or not. Properties of sets are derived from the axioms of set theory. Thus these axioms (ZFC) are thought to be true in the universe of all sets. In analogy with second order logic there are statements (CH) about sets which are true or false but we do no know which, while we do know that these statements cannot be derived from the ZFC-axioms. In a sense, truth in the universe of sets ("weak" truth) corresponds in second order logic to what we call weak logical consequence, and derivability from ZFC ("strong" truth) corresponds to what we call strong logical consequence.
It should be noted that ("weak") truth in the universe of sets is not a set-theoretical concept 12 but we can usually limit ourselves to some high level of the cumulative hierarchy and then truth is definable. This is in analogy with the situation in second order logic where sentences such as "Every linear order has a completion" cannot be given meaning without restricting them to some universal domain.
Weak logical consequence, and thereby truth in a second order characterisable structure, is a Π 2 -concept in set theory. In the Levy-hierarchy of formulas of set theory truth of a lower level is always definable in the next level. Thus there is a Σ 3 -formula which defines the truth of Π 2 -formulas. Moreover, truth of formulas on any fixed level is reflected by a closed unbounded class of levels V α of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. The problem with (weak) truth of arbitrary formulas in the entire universe of sets is that we cannot limit the formulas to any fixed level Σ n of the Levy-hierarchy and we cannot limit truth to any fixed level V α of the cumulative hierarchy.
In summary, truth in set theory goes beyond set theory and truth in second order logic goes beyond second order logic, but truth in second order logic can be defined in set theory because it is limited to the Π 2 -level of the Levy-hierarchy. This is what it means that second order logic is a fragment of set theory.
There is a possible criticism against my position on second order logic. It goes as follows: I appeal to strong logical consequence while it is weak logical consequence which is behind the ability of second order logic to characterise structures up to isomorphism. Put in other words, the second order axiomatisation of θ R of the real continuum has (up to isomorphism) only one model, but it certainly has non-isomorphic Henkin models. So if we build on Henkin models, θ R is not categorical.
This line of thought has a subtlety which needs to be brought into the open. The categoricity of θ R can be proved from the Comprehension Axioms in the following sense 13 : If a Henkin model (M, G) of the Comprehension 12 By Tarski's Undefinability of Truth argument [8] .
13 See [11, 12] .
Axioms is given with two models N, N of θ R in the range G of the relations and subsets of M , then there is in G also an isomorphism between N and N . This "strong" categoricity implies the "weak" categoricity, in which G is assumed to contain all relations and subsets of M . So how can the strongly categorical θ R have non-isomorphic Henkin models? The point is that θ R is not categorical with respect to Henkin models (M, G) and (M , G ) , where G = G . And why should it be? The G which appears in a Henkin model (M, G) is intuitively the collection of "all" relations and subsets on the domain M . There can be only one G that contains "all". In foundations of mathematics there is no outside position from which we could construct different second order parts G. I have argued that second order logic is really best understood as a fragment of set theory. The apparent problem that second order logic has second order quantifiers while set theory is presented in a first order language, is really only an apparent problem. The underlying first order logic of set theory is first order only if looked upon from outside. But there is no outside position in foundations of mathematics. We are only inside. It is more instructive to think of the first order logic of set theory as a very high order logic. After all, it allows quantification over subsets, sets of subsets, sets of sets of subsets, etc of given parameters. So its first-orderness is a little illusory.
One can prove a categoricity result also for "first order" set theory: Suppose we have two epsilon-relations ∈ 1 and ∈ 2 , and ZF C consists of the ZF C axioms in the common language {∈ 1 , ∈ 2 }. Then one can construct in ZF C a class relation F which is an isomorphism between the ∈ 1 -part and the ∈ 2 -part 14 . I claim that when second order logic and set theory are construed as foundations there is essentially no difference in their ability to capture mathematical concepts up to isomorphism. The huge difference between second order logic and first order logic disappears. The matter is different if these logics are used as tools in mathematical logic. Then we can observe such big differences as one is compact, the other is not, one is absolute, the other is not, one has Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, the other does not, etc. But this is mathematical logic, not foundations of mathematics.
14 The definition of F by transfinite recursion is z ∈ 2 F (y) ↔ ∃x(z = F (x) ∧ x ∈ 1 y). 
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